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The Illinois Parentage Act: Constitutional?
STEPHEN A. STOBBS"

INTRODUCTION
Illegitimate births account for an estimated one-third of all births in the
United States.' Although many un-wed fathers abandon the family and
leave their child fatherless, many take an active role raising the child. In either case, legislatures throughout the country consider these relationships
adverse to the child's interests. They claim that the children are confused
or will grow up with the stigma of illegitimacy. Attempting to deal with
this issue, legislatures throughout the country have limited the number of
years a putative father may bring an action for either custody or visitation.
Courts generally defer, allowing legislatures to determine "what is best for
the child." 2
In Illinois, prior to the enactment of the Illinois Parentage Act of
1984,' there was no statute which expressly governed actions by putative
fathers seeking to have their paternity established. The forerunner to the
Illinois Parentage Act, the Illinois Paternity Act, 5 did not allow putative fathers to bring an action to establish paternity at any time. Instead, a putative
father had to rely on other procedural routes, such as actions brought under
habeas corpus 6 or actions brought under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. 7 Actions could also be brought under the Juvenile

* Currently an associate with the law firm of Stobbs & Sinclair, Stephen Stobbs

received a Bachelor of Science in History from St. Louis University in 1990, and a J.D. from

the Thomas Cooley School of Law in 1994.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 77-78 (113th ed.
1993).
2. Lawrence Gabriele, Domestic Relations-Right of A Putative Father To Visit His
Illegitimate Child, 15 DEPAUL LAW REV. 192, 194 (1965).

3. 750 ILCS 45/1 (West 1993).

4. See Kapp v. Alexander, 578 N.E.2d 285, 287 (Il. App. Ct. 1991).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 1351-68 (1983). This portion of the statute was
held to unconstitutionally deny equal protection. See Jude v. Morrissey, 454 N.E.2d 24 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1983); see also infra note 84.
6. See Kapp, 578 N.E.2d at 287 (citing People ex rel. Irby v. Dubois, 354 N.E.2d

562 (Il1.App. Ct. 1976)).
7. See Kapp, 578 N.E.2d at 287 (citing In re custody of Myer, 426 N.E.2d 333 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981)).
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Court Act' or Probate Act.9 Since actions brought under these statutes
were not subject to the statute of limitation, fathers were able to assert
paternity at any time. Attempting to avoid abuse of these alternative procedural routes, the legislature delineated an exact and limited time period for
fathers to bring a claim for parentage.1° Still, there appeared to be an
apparent conflict between two sections of the act, section 7(c) and section
8(a)(2).
Section 7(c) states: "[i]f any party is a minor, he or she may be
represented by his or her general guardian, or a guardian ad litem appointed
by the court, which may include an appropriate agency. The court may
align the parties."" However, section 8(a)(2) states: "[a]n action brought
shall be barred if brought later
on behalf of any person other than the child
12
child."
the
of
birth
the
than 2 years after
Thus, a petition to establish father and child relationships, 13 filed by
the noncustodial putative father after the applicable statute of limitation had
run, would be denied; whereas a petition filed by a child or on the child's
behalf wculd be granted subject to a hearing on fitness of the child's parent
and the best interests of the child.
An Illinois appellate court considered this conflict in Kapp v. Alexan4
der.' The court decided that the legislature intended to clear the air of
stale parentage claims wherever parentage is at issue. 5 Accordingly,
"'parentage is at issue' whenever . . . [a] 'right, privilege, duty or
obligation' . . ." owed to the child is presented.16 Thus, unless the
putative father has a pre-statutory legal relationship with the child he will
be denied visitation or custody with the child. 7 Assuming the father had
established a relationship with his child, his parental rights would be terminated if he fails to comply with the statute within two years of the child's
birth.' This statutory interpretation raises some interesting constitutional

1978)).

8. See Kapp, 578 N.E.2d at 287 (citing In re Ritchie, 374 N.E.2d 1292 (Ill. App. Ct.

9. See Kapp, 578 N.E.2d at 287 (citing In re Estate of Becton, 474 N.E.2d 1318 (111.
App. Ct. 1985)).
10. See Kapp, 578 N.E.2d at 287-88.
11. 750 ILCS 45/7(c).
12. 750 ILCS 45/8(a)(2).
13. 750 ILCS 45/6.
14. 578 N.E.2d 285 (I1. App. Ct. 1991).
15. See id. at 287.
16. Id. at 288 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2502 (1989)).
17. See id.
18. Note also that if the child's birth mother chooses to remarry and have her new
husband adopt the natural father's child, some natural fathers are not required to be given
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issues which the Illinois courts have yet to consider. This critique of the
statute will consider the Illinois Parentage Act's validity in light of the
United States Supreme Court's development of parental rights and in
particular those of putative fathers.
At issue is whether Illinois can statutorily deny a putative father the
right to maintain a relationship with his out-of-wedlock child without a
hearing to determine the parent's fitness and child's best interest. This
analysis focuses on the nature of the constitutional right involved and the
degree of protection it deserves under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. First, the reader should become familiar
with the most recent Illinois case construing the Illinois Parentage Act's
statute of limitation and purpose.
I. KAPP V. ALEXANDER
In Kapp v. Alexander, 9 L.C. was born to the defendant, Terri L.
Alexander.2' The plaintiff, Martin A. Kapp, was acknowledged as the
child's father, but never acknowledged his status on any official document
or in any official proceeding. 2' However, from September 1988 until July
30, 1990, the father regularly visited the child.22 Although the father and
mother were involved in a relationship during this time, it never materialized
into marriage.
In fact, the mother eventually married another man on
April 23, 1990, whereupon the parties began disputing Kapp's role in caring
for and visiting the child.2
Kapp filed a lawsuit on August 30, 1990, seeking a finding that the
father and child relationship existed and asking for custody or at least
reasonable visitation rights with his daughter. 25 The mother filed a motion
notice of the adoption. Specifically, if a natural father has financially and emotionally
supported his child, has not established paternity through the courts and is not living with the
birth mother, he may not be required to receive notice of the pending adoption. See Illinois
Adoption Act, 750 TLCS 5/12(a)1.5 (1994); see also People v. Morrison, 584 N.E.2d 509,
513 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the Illinois Abduction Act is not unconstitutional for
treating unwed mothers and unwed fathers differently for parentage purposes because unwed
mothers and unwed fathers are dissimilarly situated by virtue of "biological reality").
Parentage is presumed for unwed mothers and must be proved through the circuit court for
unwed fathers. Id.
19. 578 N.E.2d 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
20. Id. at 286.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 287.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

to strike, claiming the Illinois Parentage Act imposes a two year limit on
such actions and as the father's action was post deadline, it should be dismissed.26 Further, the mother claimed that although Mr. Kapp regularly
visited the child, he did not provide for the child's financial needs.27 The
father claimed that the statute of limitations only applies when "parentage
is at issue" and that parentage is not at issue where, as here, the father is
known by all to be so. 2 8 The court concluded that parentage is at issue,
according to the statute, whenever there is no legal relationship between
father and child. 29 The court explained that the statute allows the father to
bring an action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship. 30 Further, that the act expressly defines the term "parent and child
relationship ... [as] the legal relationship existing between a child and his
natural or adoptive parents. 3' 1 The legislature clearly intended to establish32
fatherhood rights upon a basis other than just a biological relationship.
for a legal relationship to exist in order for
In fact, the legislature intended
33
parentage to not be at issue.
Therefore, as parentage was at issue, the limitation section applied and
Mr. Kapp's action, brought past the deadline, was denied. Given this
construction, the question remains, whether the statute is constitutional.
II.

BACKGROUND OF DUE PROCESS IN PARENT-CHILD CASES

The first ten amendments to the United States Constitution protect all
Americans from certain governmental actions. Further, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the states from denying these
rights to their citizens. The Due Process Clause states in part that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
26. Id.
27. Id. at 286-87. The father disputed this and pointed to a bank account set up in
January 1990 showing weekly deposits of $25.00. Id. The mother contends the deposits
were for money owed to her, and that is the reason she made withdrawals. Id.
28. Id. at 287.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 288.
32. See id. The statute states:
Parent and Child Relationship Defined. As used in this Act, 'parent and child
relationship' means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural
or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the father
and child relationship.
750 ILCS § 45/2 (West 1993).
33. Kapp, 587 N.E.2d at 288.
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34

After passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867, the Supreme
Court began reviewing the scope and purpose of the Due Process Clause.
One of the first examinations by the Court was the Slaughterhouse Cases."
These cases dealt with New Orleans butchers who complained that state-run
monopolies deprived them of the opportunity to pursue their trade.36 This
deprivation of property without due process of law was in violation of their
constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 The Court
wrote that this clause was limited to State action against a national citizen,
but not against a state citizen. 3 However, the significance of the decision
is in the dissent by Justice Field. He wrote that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes the existence of certain fundamental
rights belonging to all citizens of the United States which rights could not
be arbitrarily infringed by the state. 39 There are many fundamental rights
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. The Supreme Court
developed a list based on the nature of the claimed right. For example, the

Id.

34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

35. Butcher Benevolent Assoc. of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing
and Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) [hereinafter Slaughterhouse Cases].
In his dissent, Justice Field sounded a familiar tune when he declared certain rights
fundamental. Id. at 83 (Field, J., dissenting). The theory actually originated with the concept
of natural law championed by great philosophers--most notably John Locke of England. The
theory was made law in England with the enactment of the English Bill of Rights in 1689.
Finally, in 1765, William Blackstone published commentaries on laws of England which
unequivocally proclaimed these rights inalienable and existent as a common right of man.
Blackstone wrote:
[R]ights of individuals, we mean those, which are so in their primary and strictest
sense; such as would belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which
every man is entitled to enjoy whether out of society or in it .... These therefore
were formerly either by inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind... these
may be reduced to three principles or primary articles; the right to personal
security, the right of personal liberty; and the right to private property.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 119, 125 (1966).
36. Slaughterhouse Cases, supra note 35, at 36.
37. Id. at 56.
38. Id. at 52-55.
39. Id. at 109-11 (Field, J., dissenting).
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right to privacy, not specifically mentioned in the First Amendment, is an
interest falling under a "penumbra" of First Amendment rights." This
"penumbra" includes rights which historically and traditionally are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.4 The degree
of scrutiny used to review the constitutionality of statutes depends on
whether a fundamental right is involved. A court will strictly review the
states' reasons for abridging a fundamental right, sustaining a statute only
if it serves a compelling state interest. 42 On the other hand, if the court
feels that no specially protected "fundamental" right is involved, the court
reviews the statute liberally, upholding it so long as it bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate state objective. 43 Thus, the judicial standard of
review is critical, because virtual deference is given to the state's judgement
under a rational relationship test.
Establishing the existence of a "fundamental right" to parentage and
applying it to fathers engaged in existing relationships with their out-ofwedlock children is necessary to determine the validity of a state's effort to
terminate the same. The fundamental right of parenthood is included within
the protected sphere of the family unit. Accordingly, the state can only
interfere where there is a substantial state interest. However, as the precise
definition of family unit remains undeclared, the scope of its constitutional
protection is also unknown. In particular, it is unknown whether the Court
extends the definition to include fathers of illegitimate children.
The Court first recognized the constitutionally protected family unit in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters." This case dealt with the constitutionality of
an Oregon statute which required all students ages eight through sixteen to
attend public schools. 45 The act was challenged by a Roman Catholic
orphanage and a private military academy. Both parties argued that this act
would destroy their schools and was therefore a deprivation of property
without due process of law. 46 Significantly, the Court recognized "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control., 47 The Court found the state's attempt to
interfere with a child's rearing "an attempt to standardize its children by

40. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 481 (1965).
41. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

42. Id.
43. See generally Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
44. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

45. Id.at 531.
46. Id. at 532.
47. Id. at 534-35.
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forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only., 4 The Court
went on to state that the parents have both the right, coupled with the high
duty, to raise the child properly and prepare him for future obligations.49
The Court indicated the importance of a combination of parental rights
and duties, such that a parent can not claim one without the other.50
Accordingly, a putative father, claiming an unconstitutional denial of natural
parental rights, does not have standing unless he can prove an existing
relationship with the child. Once proven by specific evidence, the father's
interest becomes included in the protected sphere of the family unit. The
state cannot then interfere with this relationship absent compelling state
interests.
Next, in 1944, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
Massachusetts child labor law which prohibited children from publicly
soliciting magazines and newspapers. 5' Sarah Prince was the aunt of Betty
M. Simmons, a nine year old. Ms. Prince allowed Betty to sell magazines
in public, and was convicted for violating the Act. 52 Ms. Prince felt that
since the material solicited was in furtherance of her religious belief, the
State's prohibition violated her First Amendment religious freedom. 53 She
added that her parental rights, protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, were violated by an act which interfered with a
child's religious development.'
The state argued that the purpose of the child labor statute was to
protect children from economic exploitation.5 5 This was consistent with its
obligation to protect the general welfare of all children. 56 The Court
discussed the rights of parents to instruct children on religious belief. It
agreed that the children have a constitutionally protected right to receive

48. Id. at 535.
49. Id. This combination of parental rights and duties is an important factor when
considering the putative father's right to visitation with his illegitimate child. The courts will
not recognize a protected relationship where the only nexus between father and child is
biological. It is important to undertake many of the parental duties as well. For further
discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 77,78.
50. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.

51. See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
52. Id. at 160. Ms. Prince was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses order and
considered her niece an ordained minister. She believed that if she 'did not continue
preaching and soliciting the faiths religious material in public she would be condemned to
everlasting destruction at Armageddon. Id. at 161-63.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 167 n.7.
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religious training in many different respects.5 7 The Court recognized the
realm of family life, its sanctity, and constitutionally protected sphere.58
In addition, the Court noted that the "custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
59
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."
However, the Court respected the state's role in regulating the public interest
against claimed rights.' The Court upheld the statute as a reasonable
means of averting some of the immediate dangers that may affect a child in
their tender years. 6' Importantly, in upholding the statute, the Court
narrowly construed its proscription. The legislation proscribed preaching
and solicitation in public places only and thus was not an absolute proscription on children exercising certain religious functions. The Court seemed
to find this narrow construction necessary since the liberty interests
involved, religious freedom and parental autonomy, were substantial. In
fact, the Court considered these interests to be as important as other
protected liberty interests when it said, "the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as
is true in the case of other freedoms."62 The dissent by Justice Murphy
argued that the state did not meet the burden of showing any immediate or
grave danger present to validate the restriction on religion and private family
matters. 63 This statement seems to indicate the heavy burden a state must
prove in order to interfere with the family. Hence, consistent with Meyer
v. Nebraska' and Pierce, the Court heightened the interest of the intimate
family relationship as substantial.
In declaring the family unit a constitutionally protected sphere and
extending its coverage to the traditional parent/child relationship, the Court
did not specifically define its scope. Thus, when challenged by the father
of an illegitimate child who complained that the state violated his constitutional right to maintain a relationship with his daughter, the Court applied
a "developed relationship test" to determine whether this father's interest
57. Id. at 165. The Court referred to Pierce for the proposition that children have the
right to receive religious education. Id.

58. Id.

59. Id. at 166.
60. id. at 166.
61. Id. at 169.
62. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 173 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
64. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Meyer Court was one of the first to recognize that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects more than just economic
rights. While not yet adopting a strict scrutiny test, the decision began the progression of
closely protected fundamental liberty interests, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
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qualified as a traditional one.
Notably, in 1972, the Court in Stanley v. Illinois6 extended constitutional protection to fathers who developed relationships with their illegitimate children. Peter Stanley was the father of three children. He and Joan
Stanley" did not marry, and under then Illinois law, "the children of
67
unwed father [became] wards of the State upon the death of the mother."
The challenge to the Illinois statute was made on equal protection grounds.
Stanley claimed that presumptions of parental unfitness for only those
fathers who remained unwed to the mother were unconstitutional.6"
Further, he argued that due process required that all parents with an interest
be given a fair hearing on their fitness to care for their children. 69 The
Court began its discussion, recognizing that "due process of law does not
require a hearing 'in every conceivable case of government impairment of
private interest. '7 Nonetheless, the Court explained that it is the nature
of the private interest and the countervailing weight of the governmental
interest that must be balanced. 7' Further, where a "fundamental right" is
involved, balancing of the interests cannot be done presumptively by statute.
Instead, the individual is entitled to a judicial hearing considering all the
facts. The Court then identified the private interest as that of a father who
sired, raised and nurtured his children without legitimizing them officially. 72 The Court severed this interest from other unprotected economic
interests and proclaimed that the father's interest in his children is one that
73
should be protected "absent a powerful countervailing [state] interest."
This substantial liberty interest stems from the traditional protection afforded
to the family interest recognized in the cases discussed above. The Court
relied on Meyer, Skinner and Prince74 for its conclusions. The State
claimed that by removing the child from a family setting which would
destroy its moral, mental and physical welfare, the State was protecting the
65. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

66. She was known as Joan Stanley although she was never married to Peter Stanley.
Id. at 646-47.
67. Id. at 646.
68. Id.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

73. Id. (emphasis added).

74. Id. The Court strongly endorsed the substantial interest at hand as consistent with
the integrity of the family unit protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth
Amendment. Id.
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best interest of the community.75 While the Court approved the claimed
ends, it admonished that the means used to achieve those ends were the
relevant concern. 76 Due process analyzes the means used to achieve the
stated ends. Under this scope, the statute was unconstitutional. In fact, in
Stanley's case, the means may produce the opposite of the stated ends.
Thus, removing children from fit parents may destroy their moral, mental
and physical welfare and thereby derogate the state's purported interest."
In the Court's opinion, "procedure by presumption" may "needlessly risk
running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child."7"
As a result, the Court held that such presumptions in the face of the substantial constitutional interests cannot stand.79 Where the father developed a
relationship with his child, his interest in maintaining the family relationship
was too important to justify denying the same in the interest of convenience
and judicial economy.
The significance of Stanley cannot be stated in this short discussion.
However, Stanley gave to putative fathers what Roe v. Wade 0 gave to
women. It clearly stated the nature of the putative father's interest in
continuing a relationship with his illegitimate child.8 ' It struck down
statutes which presume that unwed fathers are unfit to maintain a relationship with their children and care for the children's best interests. Without
using specific terms, the Court essentially expanded the Fourteenth
Amendment's list of protected "fundamental" rights to include the nature of
the interest presented in Stanley. However, to protect such an interest, the
father must have a developed relationship with his child. His interest then
fits within the scope of the protected family unit.
Subsequent to Stanley, the Court more clearly explained the developed
relationship element, poignantly stating that a biological relationship alone
is not enough to establish a protected liberty interest. First, in Caban v.
Mohammed, 2 the Court upheld the "due process right of natural fathers to
maintain a parental relationship with their children absent a finding that they
are unfit as parents."83 The decision in Caban, however, does not rest on
this principal, since the father was given proper process to contest the

75. Id. at 652.
76. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650-51.
77. See id. at 652-53.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83..

Id. at 656-57.
Id. at 656-57.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
Id. at 385.
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adoption of his illegitimate children.84 Still, the decision validates Stanley,
in concluding that the father with a developed relationship deserves proper
process. Justice Stewart confirmed as much in his dissent when he noted
that it is the "unwed father who has an established relationship with his
illegitimate child [that] is not denied the opportunity to participate in the
adoption proceeding."8 5 He agreed with the majority that parental rights
are not based on biological connections alone, but require relationships
between parent and child.86
Thus, where this nexus exists the liberty interest vests and is protected
by the Due Process Clause. But, the difference between a father who has
developed a relationship with the child and one who seeks to develop a
relationship was considered in Lehr v. Robertson. 7
Applying the developed relationship test, Justice Stevens denied a putative father's claim that New York must give him notice before initiating
adoption proceedings concerning his illegitimate child. 8 The father in
84. Id. at 385 n.3. In its holding, the Court addressed the due process claim and
simply expressed no view on it since the New York state statute was invalidated on Equal
Protection grounds. Id. at 394, n.16. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), the Court
for the first time applied heightened judicial scrutiny to statutes which effectively
discriminate against illegitimate children. Id. at 75. Thus, statutes of limitations barring
actions to establish paternity brought by illegitimate children were also violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. See generally Pickett v.Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91 (1982); Florida v. Ronald Jerome West, 378 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1979).
Accordingly, Illinois invalidated the old Paternity Act's statute of limitations for paternity
actions. See genarally Jude v. Morrissey, 454 N.E.2d 24 (III. App. Ct. 1983) (Petition for
Leave to Appeal denied). Likewise, the Illinois Adoption Act of 1969 was similarly invalidated on Equal Protection grounds. The Illinois Supreme-Court held that "[denying] a hearing to determine the fitness of a father for the custody of his children born out of wedlock
while extending this right to other parents is based upon an unreasonable distinction and
violates equal-protection [sic] principles." Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 284 N.E.2d
291, 292 (Iil. 1972). However, the current statute under question, the Illinois Parentage Act
of 1984, was unsuccessfully challenged on equal protection grounds. In Klawitter v.
Crawford, 541 N.E. 2d 1159 (III. App. Ct. 1989), the court considered the father's claim that
the statute denies equal protection in that it limits only father's rights to bring a paternity
action to two years. The court dismissed this challenge since the father was not a member
of a suspect class and "the statutory classification which the plaintiff alleges is discriminatory
is based upon persons other than the illegitimate child for whose benefit a paternity action
is instituted." Id. at 1162. Thus, the court applied the rational basis test and upheld the
statute on Equal Protection grounds. See also Majidi v. Palmer, 530 N.E.2d 66 (111.
App. Ct.
1988), infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Caban, 441 U.S. at 395 (emphasis added) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 397. See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Id. at 263-64.
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Lehr had no established relationship with the child. 9
First, the Court considered the due process claim asserted by the father.
Running through the list of cases discussing the putative father's liberty
interest, the Court concluded that: "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates
a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'coming forward
to participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest in personal contact with
his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause."'
The putative father's registry adopted by New York adequately considered
the interest of the putative father as well as the State's interest in providing
for the best interest of the child. The process of submitting a postcard with
the father's name was a simple procedure and therefore adequately protected
the father's right to participate in future judicial proceedings regarding the
child's disposition. The Court did not depart from Stanley or Caban.
Instead, it indicated that if "this scheme were likely to omit many responsible fathers ... it might be thought procedurally inadequate." 91 Thus, the
Court once again recognized the distinction between fathers who establish
relationships with their children and those who do not. The Court simply
decided that a responsible father could easily send in a postcard to the
father's registry and thereby protect his rights. The pre-procedure estab92
lished was thus reasonable and supported substantial state interests.
Moreover, the Court affirmed the father's obligation to step forward and
participate in order to have standing. In Stanley, the father had developed
a relationship with his child, and in Lehr, the father sought one. 93 This
major difference determined the level of process each father deserved.
Finally, in Michael H. v. GeraldD.,94 the Court once again upheld the
putative father's protected liberty interest established in Stanley and the line
of cases which followed that decision. However, under the specific
circumstances of this case, Justice Scalia and a plurality of the Court denied
the putative father the right to establish paternity.9"
Under California law there is a conclusive presumption of parenthood

89. Id. at 262.
90. Id. at 261 (citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
91. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
92. Justice White, in his dissent, went further than the majority and recognized a
liberty interest in a biological relationship alone. He wrote: "The 'nature' of the interest is
the parent-child relationship ...[w]hether Lehr's interest is entitled to constitutional protection, does not entail a searching inquiry into the quality of the relationship but a simple determination of the fact that a relationship exists." Id. at 271-72 (White, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 261.
94. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
95. Id. at 128-29.
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where the child is born to a married couple.96 Michael H., the child's
father, brought a claim for visitation or custody. Because the child was born
to a married couple, the paternity presumption applied, and Michael's
petition was dismissed. 97 Michael appealed, claiming that this presumption
denies him the right to assert parentage in violation of his due process
rights. 98 However, Justice Scalia claimed that there was no fundamental
right of a natural father to assert parental rights where his child is born to
a woman's existing marriage with another man.99 He justified his opinion
by stating that there was no history or tradition to support such a particular
claim.' °° While Scalia's opinion seems to punch a hole in the welldeveloped constitutional right of a putative father, it does not. The dissent,
led by Justice Brennan, carefully reminds the reader that: "five members of
the Court refuse to foreclose 'the possibility that a natural father might ever
have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child
whose mother was married to, and cohabiting with, another man at the time
of the child's conception and birth." ' 0 Further, the five members also
agreed that the flaw in conclusive presumptions which abridge a constitutionally protected interest is procedural, rather than substantive, as Michael
02
claimed.
Justice Scalia simply pre-balanced the interests of Michael and the state

96. CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989).

97. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115.
98. Id. at 116.
99. Id. at 125.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
102. Id. Consider also In re J.W.T., No. D-1742, 1993 WL 566210 (Tex. Feb. 2,1994).
The facts of this case are nearly the same as Michael H. The Texas Supreme Court,
however, declared that a statute which denies the putative father a right of action of paternity
unconstitutional by the Texas Due Course of Law Clause. The court construing the due
process law decided that the putative father has standing where: (1)"[he] acknowledges
responsibility for child support or other care and maintenance, and (2) makes serious and
continuous efforts to establish a relationship with the child." Id.at *6. The Texas Supreme
Court considered the child's interest paramount, but the purported danger, disruption of an
existing family relationship by an outsider, are diminished today by blood testing procedures
which rarely fail to identify the biological father. Id. at *7. The Court recognized that
Michael H. came to an opposite conclusion, but decided that the facts of that case are "an
aberration." Id. In fact, the court correctly points out that only four members of the Michael
H. Court upheld the presumption of the paternity statute, but five others were not willing to
overturn precedent which recognized a putative father's constitutionally protected liberty
interest. Id. See also Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed
Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1988); Mary Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families
and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1991).
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and concluded that because Michael would lose in a hearing, no further
inquiry was necessary. 10 3 However, according to five members, Scalia's
substantive due process analysis in this particular case does not necessarily
extend to procedural due process claims upheld in the cases discussed
above.' °
Thus, the Stanley interest recognized, defined and explained by Quilloin
05
, Caban, and Lehr, is still good law today. Justice Brennan,
v. Walcott"
relying on the above cases properly proclaims the rule:
On four prior occasions, we have considered whether
unwed fathers have a constitutionally protected interest in
their relationships with their children.... Though different in factual and legal circumstances, these cases have
produced a unifying theme: although an unwed father's
biological link to his child does not, in and of itself,
guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship
with that child, such a link combined with a substantial
parent-child relationship will do so.106
Michael H. can therefore be limited to its facts. To allow a father such as
Michael to disrupt a family, would be adverse to the state's interest in
legitimacy and protecting the integrity of the family unit. Statutes which
presume paternity advance those same interests.
In essence, over the past sixty-five years, putative fathers have
developed a constitutionally protected right to maintain a relationship with
a child with whom they have already developed a relationship. The state
can only interfere if there is a substantial or compelling reason. The current
Illinois statute, terminating a putative father's interest after two years, must
therefore undergo the same level of scrutiny.,
III. APPLICATION TO ILLINOIS PARENTAGE STATUTE

Generally, Illinois courts have accepted the above constitutional
analysis and thus recognize a putative father's protected liberty interest in
his out-of-wedlock child. 0 7 In Pritz v. Pritz'° the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District realized the constitutional effect of a statute
which presumptively decided the fitness of a putative father or the best
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

But see Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126 n.5; Id. at 161 (White J., dissenting).
Id. at 136.
434 U.S. 246 (1978).
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added).
Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 284 N.E.2d 291, 292 (Ill. 1972).
436 N.E.2d 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
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interest of the child. °9 The statute, which barred the father from bringing
any action to continue a parental relationship with his child, was deemed
unconstitutional."' 0 Interpreting the old Paternity Act of 1957,"' the
court concluded that the Act "should not be construed to bar a declaratory
judgment action by a putative father to establish his parentage and parental
rights."' 2 Relying on recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the appellate
court noted that "a natural father, absent a finding that he is unfit, has a due
process right to maintain a parental relationship with his children."" 3 The
court went on to note that the substantial interest established in Stanley was
applied by the Illinois Supreme Court in Slawek v. Covenant Children's
Home." Since the court considered the state's interest to be not substantially related, it refused to construe the statute as preventing such parentage
claims." 5' Accordingly, it did not invalidate the statute, rather it gave it
6
a constitutionally acceptable construction instead."
The appellate court in Pritz sent a message that statutes which bar petitions for parentage rights are unconstitutional on their face." 7 Similarly,
an Illinois appellate court in Lehew v. Mellyn, 1 8 relying on Quilloin,
Stanley, Slawek, and Pritz, held that the United States Supreme Court and
the Illinois courts have established that a natural father, absent a finding that
he is unfit, has a due process right to maintain a parental relationship with
his children."19

109. Id. at 635.
110.

Id.

11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 paras. 1351-68 (1983).

112. Pritz, 436 N.E.2d at 633. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (describing
the invalidation of the old Paternity Act and the rationalizations used to justify the present
one).
113. Pritz, 436 N.E.2d at 633.
114. 284 N.E.2d 291 (III. 1972).
115. Pritz, 436 N.E.2d at 634. Actually, the court based its conclusion that the statute
failed to overcome a substantial relationship test on equal protection grounds, but the idea
that the interest involved requires a substantial relationship is important for due process
analysis as well.
116. See id. at 634. The court clearly stated that "the plaintiff, as the putative father
of an illegitimate child, had the constitutional right to a legal forum with due process
procedures to establish his natural parentage and his parental rights." Id.
117. See id. at 635. Citing Stanley and Slawek, the court noted that where the Paternity
Act bars a putative father's right of action constitutional problems abound. Id.
118. 475 N.E.2d 913 (III. App. Ct. 1985).
119. Id. at 913-914. See also People v. Morrison, 584 N.E.2d 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
Becton v. Sanders, 474 N.E.2d 1318 (111.App. Ct. 1985).
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In response to the foregoing, the Illinois legislature passed the revised
Parentage Act of 1984."w As noted in the introduction, this act limits a
father's petition for parental rights to two years after birth. After that time,
his rights are arbitrarily terminated. Instead of addressing the constitutionality of the statute, Illinois courts find alternative routes to allow the father's
petition. In McDonald v. McGowan,' the court side-stepped the statute,
appointed a guardian ad litem for the minor child, and allowed the child to
bring the action for parentage. 22 The court followed sound constitutional
law when it claimed that "every child has an interest in visitation with her
parents, until the evidence shows that such visitation is against the child's
best interests."'" The court then explained that the mother, by moving to
dismiss, did not wish to establish visitation between the daughter and her father. 1
This, therefore, represents a conflict of interest between the custodial
parent and child, requiring that the child's interest be represented by a legal
guardian."z The court therefore reversed the dismissal and remanded the
litem.'2
case to the circuit court with instructions to appoint a guardian ad
The court in Kapp probably was correct when it stated that the putative
father "may not avoid the provisions of the Parentage Act by using
alternative procedural routes in seeking to obtain incidents of the father and
child relationship."' 27 In either case, the constitutionality of Illinois'
Paternity Act was not considered.
On the other hand, one Illinois court seems to be on the right track.
In Padin v. Padin,128 appellate judge Stouder simply declared the statute
of limitations of the Parentage Act inapplicable to situations where parentage
was not at issue.' 29 In fact, the statute clearly states that the limitations
period applies only where parentage is at issue. 30 According to Stouder,
parentage was not at issue because the father was listed on the daughter's

120. Klawitter v. Crawford, 541 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
121. 516 N.E.2d 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
122. Id. at 936.

Id. at 935.
Id.
Id.
Id. This approach was followed by Majidi v. Palmer, 530 N.E.2d 66 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988). See supra note 76 (describing some of the judicial interpretations of past and present
123.
124.
125.
126.

paternity acts).

127. Kapp v. Alexander, 578 N.E.2d 285, 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
128. 550 N.E.2d 276 (111.App. Ct. 1990).

129. Id. at 276.
130. 750 ILCS 45/1 (West 1994).
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birth certificate. 3' The problem with this analysis is it limits its holding
to cases where there is a legal tie or relationship, thereby excluding fathers
who have developed relationships without a legal tie to their children. Still,
this interpretation is consistent with section two of the statute which
indicates the necessity for such a legal relationship. Thus, the legal tie
restriction misses the scope of the constitutionally recognized interest
developed in Stanley, Quilloin, Slawek, and Pritz. If the court included
instances where the father was both biologically and socially attached to the
child, then the decision would pass constitutional muster. Unfortunately, the
decision would then conflict with the language of the statute, leaving Illinois
courts in the same state of confusion they are in today.'
CONCLUSION

The Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 is unconstitutional. The family unit
is a constitutionally protected sphere. Its definition includes formal ties
between parents and children, such as marriage or blood relationship, but
also behavioral factors such as emotional attachments and daily associa"'
tion. 33
Thus, the Supreme Court today applies a developed relationship
test to determine whether a father of an illegitimate child has a sufficient
relationship to warrant constitutional protection. Factors to consider in this
analysis include, the emotional attachments, daily associations, financial
support and the formal ties of blood relationship or prior marriage with the
mother. 34
Once established, the constitutionally protected parental
131. In re Padin, 550 N.E.2d 276, 277 (III. App. Ct. 1989).
132. Procedural Due Process in the form of a hearing may involve the following set of
factors:
(1) [t]he child's age, the environment he will live in, and the capabilities of the
mother and the putative father as parents; (2) will the visits upset the home of the
child due to possible emotional conflicts between the parents; (3) does the
illegitimate child have half-brothers and sisters who have a different father (causing
the child to have a confused state of mind); (4) what will other people in the
community (especially immediate neighbors) feel about the situation, since these
feelings can be projected to the child; (5) and, if the child is adopted by the
husband of a subsequent marriage, will the putative father's occasional appearance
disturb the adoption. Beneficial factors include the following: (1) the putative
father can ascertain if the child is being cared for properly, once the child's welfare
is removed from the court's responsibility; (2) the father's love and affection is
necessary in a child's upbringing; (3) and, if the child knows his natural father
from an early age, he might be able to bear more easily the ignominy of his origin
at a more mature age.
Gabriele, supra note 2, at 195.
133. See Dallas, supra note 102, at 378.
134. Id. at 384.
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relationship vests and cannot be terminated without due process of law or
without a compelling state interest for denying the same. Despite these
protections, the Illinois Parentage Act terminates a fathers relationship with
his child after two years if the father never legally established parentage.
The Act thereby arbitrarily and unconstitutionally deprives him of the right
to establish parentage without due process of law.
Although the states have long maintained, and the courts have agreed,
that there is a valid state interest in preventing stale claims and protecting
the best interest of the child, the means employed to achieve those stated
ends are not valid. Balancing the father's rights and the state's interest can
not be done by a presumptive application of the statute. "Pre-balancing" is
not a constitutionally acceptable means of protecting a father's liberty
interest. The above analysis clearly demonstrates that the best interest of the
child is the ultimate goal. Adhering to the long common law tradition of
declaring children legitimate, the U.S. Supreme Court upholds statutes which
presume fatherhood such as that in Michael H. and invalidate those that cut
off a father's custodial rights, such as the one in Stanley. The idea is that
some kind of legitimacy is favorable for out-of-wedlock children than no
legitimacy at all. The Illinois courts need to consider that despite the state's
interest in barring stale claims, a single father has fundamental rights in the
relationship he has established with his children--a relationship which, in the
best interests of the child, should not arbitrarily be denied by a statute which
presumes that all unmarried men desert their children. To be constitutionally valid, the Illinois' Parentage Act should make exceptions for those men

who do not.135

Editor's Note-The reader should be aware that this article was authored in 1994. The
statute that is the focus of the article has been amended at 750 ILCS 45/8 (a)(1). The statute
now reads as follows:
An action brought by a party alleging that he is the child's natural father shall be
barred if brought later than 2 years after the child's birth if the party has forgone
his parental rights as manifested by his failure for a period of 36 months to visit,
provide supportfor, or communicate with the child although able to do so.

Id. (emphasis added). The statute now provides an avenue for putative fathers with
developed relationships to pursue their claim for paternity rights. However, the statute does
not expressly state that it is retroactive, thus having no effect on cases pending in court and
grandfathered by the pre-amended statute. Further, the act does not state how much contact
is necessary, nor does it expressly give to the court the discretion to decide. In any event, the
argument presented by Mr. Stobbs is consistent with the recent amendment to the statute.

